film itself, or the original documentary as a script, or even the many re-discoveries of this period of history by the media, it can be said that
pseudo-history is in power.
What this article clarifies is only a part of these pseudo-history.
2012-12-07 The 95th issue of the movie "1942" poster
The government suppresses public opinion and does not allow the media to report the Henan famine?
On February 3, 1943, the Chongqing Ta Kung Pao
was suspended for three days by the authorities for publishing an editorial titled "Looking at Chongqing, Thinking of the Central Plains" by Wang Yunsheng, the host of the newspaper. Based on this, the film and many media believe that the Nationalist government suppressed public opinion and
did not allow media to report the Henan famine [detailed].
"Ta Kung Pao" was suspended for three days, not because of its report on the famine in Henan, but "accusation of the failure to limit prices"
"Ta Kung Pao" was suspended for three days, but the reason for its suspension was not because the editorial reported on Henan
Great famine. According to Wang Shijie's diary on February 4, 1943, the real reason for its suspension was: "Ta Kung Pao was suspended for three days
because of its failure to limit prices." Wang Shi was the head of the Central Propaganda Department of the National Government ,
had just resigned on December 7 , 1942 . In his capacity, he naturally knew the real reason why Ta Kung Pao was suspended. In other words, reporting on
famines is not illegal, but accusing the government of ineffective price fixing has angered the authorities.
Before Ta Kung Pao was suspended, Chongqing's Xinhua Daily had at least 40 reports on
the famine in Henan. In fact, the National Government had never restricted media coverage of the famine in Henan. For example, Chongqing "Xinhua Daily"
, from August 1942 to February 3, 1943 when "Ta Kung Pao" was suspended, according to the author's incomplete statistics, reported
There are more than 40 pieces of news about the famine in Henan; among them, the most reported in December, as shown in the following table:
Disaster victims in Shaanxi and Henan, the Shaanxi provincial government tried to relieve
the disaster
in Henan Province
1942 , 12, 1
[Luoyang , 1942, 12, 1] The Disaster Relief Contest from All walks of life will be extended to the 10th of this month] (Briefing News) 1942, 12,
3 Abandoned infants in
Henan disaster, donate to relief
1942 , 12, 4
[Fu Zuoyi donates 10,000 yuan to relief the disaster in Henan] (Briefing News)
1942 , 12, 5
Henan disaster relief, warm response from all walks of life in Luoyang, Bishop Mi Gan came to Chongqing to raise relief
for
Henan disaster on 1942, 12, 7, the government allocated 10 million yuan, Wei Lihuang and others initiated the expansion of fundraising
1942 , 12, 8
Henan disaster, letters from the disaster area
Painful famine 1942, 12, 10 The
affected people migrated and the cultivated land was barren. The authorities of Henan Province stipulated the method of cultivating on behalf of others, and raised the Ping Tiao fund and
food
.
1942 , 12, 11
Relief for the disaster in Henan. The American Aid China Association sent members to Henan, presided over the distribution of the association's relief funds, and the Shaanxi Provincial Government allocated funds to shelter children
in the disaster
. , in the past four months, 120,000 people have been distributed to
1942 , 12, 14 for the
relief of the Henan disaster, the Agricultural Bank of China rushed to arrange the second batch of disaster-stricken areas, and the whole province donated one day's income to help the Henan disaster
1942
, 12, 15. Disaster relief funds have been raised for more than 400,000
1942, 12, 16
Front-line soldiers sympathized with the disaster in Henan, and officers and soldiers in the X war zone went on a diet to help the disaster relief
1942 , 12, 18
Henan Province raised funds for disaster relief, which is expected to reach 50 million yuan by the end of the
year
. The county donated food and salary, and the provinces donated one
after another . Porridge Factory, Henan Construction Hall planning next spring ploughing 1942 , 12, 28 Yu shoot down corrupt officials 1942 , 12, 29 Officers and soldiers in the Henan War Zone for disaster relief, automatic reduction of two meals a month, Chiang Kai-shek special telegram award 1942 , 12, 29 [A division of the Army Mission, one-day hunger strike for disaster relief in Henan] (Briefing News) 1942 , 12, 30 International Friends Association for Henan Disaster Relief 1942 , 12, 31 Chongqing "Xinhua Daily" was published in the Kuomintang area at that time, and the contents of its publication were similar to those of Chongqing "Ta Kung Pao" It is also subject to the censorship of the National Government Press Inspection Agency. However, none of the more than 40 reports on the famine in Henan were banned and punished ; after the Ta Kung Pao was punished, by June 1943, according to the author's incomplete statistics, Chongqing "Xinhua Daily" reported on the famine . There are at least more than 80 articles, and the specific article titles and reporting dates will not be listed one by one in a list. The so-called National Government did not allow the media to report the Henan famine, which is obviously untrue. In fact, no matter before or after the disaster, the government has never restricted the reporting of the Henan famine. Ta Kung Pao was suspended for three days, not because it reported the famine, but because it attacked the government.
Before and after Ta Kung Pao was punished, its reports on the famine in Henan were also never interrupted
. Ta Kung Pao, which was suspended for three days, actually had quite a few reports on the famine in Henan before it was punished, and these reports
were not received by the authorities . ban and punishment. The following is the author's incomplete statistics on the newspaper's report on the famine in Henan in 1942:
Luoyang was rainy, and Yu purchased Shaanxi grain for disaster relief on
September 12 , 1942,
on behalf of Minister Xu yesterday
. 1942 , September, 30 to inspect the disaster in Henan (Zhang Ji and Zhang Lisheng were sent to Henan) 1942 , October , 1 to rescue the disaster in Henan ; 10 , 8 to investigate the Henan disaster, Zhang Ji et al. departed from Luo 1942 , 10, 25 Henan disaster victims resettled 1942, 10, 29 to express condolences to the Henan disaster, Zhang Ji et al returned to Xi'an 1942 , 11, 5 to revive the Henan disaster, the central government will 1942 , 12, 3 Re-appropriation for emergency relief efforts in Henan Province , raising the Tiao Fund, borrowing food from rich households At the end of the year, chanting victims of disasters1942 , 12, 28
It is worth mentioning that the disclosure of the severity of the famine in Henan in the article "The Witness of the Famine in Henan Province" is in no way inferior to that of the "Record of the Henan Disaster" in which
Wang Yunsheng distributed editorial comments and caused trouble. There are many tragic incidents in this report. The death cases of starving people, such as "
In Xuancheng, a family of five or six people surnamed Chen was forced to commit suicide by eating arsenic at the same time. After taking the poison, the neighbors did not come to help,
and said: 'Death early, suffer less!'" Wang Yunsheng An editorial titled "Remembering the Disaster at the End of the Cold Year" was also distributed for the report, but both reports were successfully published because they
never criticized the government's wartime policies. Three days after its publication was suspended on February 2, 1943, Ta Kung Pao
actually continued to report on the Henan famine. As far as I can see, its coverage continued at least until June 20 of that year, when
Zhang Gaofeng's front-line report "After the Disaster" was published. Talking about agricultural conditions - Henan Xinmai debuts.
Chiang Kai-shek was not allowed to report disasters and "doesn't believe there was a disaster in Henan at all"?
Movies and media used to say that Chiang Kai-shek was unwilling to rescue disasters and "doesn't believe there was a disaster in Henan at all". There are three popular historical data bases.
All three sources have problems.
Feng Yuxiang's memories are vivid, but Li Peiji never went to Chongqing to report the disaster, so how could he be scolded by Chiang Kai-shek?
One is Feng Yuxiang's memory. In 1947, Feng wrote his memoir "I Know Chiang Kai-shek" in the United States, in which he said: "
Everyone knows about the severe drought in Henan. This drought is centered on Yexian County, with a surrounding area of seven or eight hundred miles, grass roots and bark. They were
all eaten up by the starving people. I don’t know how many people died of starvation. They were all over the place, and it was impossible to calculate. Under such misery, Chiang Kai-shek even asked for food from
Henan. The chairman of Henan really had no choice. He boldly told Chiang Kai-shek. : 'The drought is too severe.' Chiang Kai-shek
slapped the table and cursed, saying: 'I have no shame, no personality at all, just spread rumors. I know
Henan Province is a good harvest, but you Say there is a drought!' I cursed for an hour with no personality long and no personality short.
See no concern for human life. "The previous special issue "Analysis of the 1942 Henan Famine and Man-made Disasters" has been verified. Feng's so-called
"Henan Chairman" is named Li Peiji. Before the central government sent people to Henan to investigate, what Li was trying to do
, He was not reporting the disaster, but concealing it. Yang Yifeng, who was recommended by all walks of life in Henan to report the disaster in Chongqing, "found out in Chongqing
the report submitted by Li Peiji, then chairman of Henan Province, to the central government, saying that the food harvest in Henan was good. "The fact is exactly the opposite of what
Feng Yuxiang said. Since Mrs. Li has never met Chiang Kai-shek to complain about the disaster, the so-called "no personality long, no personality short cursed for
an hour", obviously can only come from Feng Yuxiang's fabrication. Guo Zhongwei said that
"the central government is not allowed to report disasters and does not provide relief", but the Henan military has reported disasters many times, and because of this, it has a head-on conflict with the Henan provincial government
. In my later years, I recalled in the book "Jiangliu Tiandiwai". According to
Guo Shi : In 1942, I continued to serve as the third national political suffrage member. It was a severe drought in Henan. Except for a few paddy fields, not a single grain was
harvested . Not allowed to report disasters, nor to provide relief, I used the political clerk to run around and spare no effort. "As a result, more than 5 million people died of starvation in
Henan, and Li Peiji, the chairman of Henan, reported only 1,602 people, which is unprecedented in politics." Guo said, " The central government is not allowed to report disasters, and it will not provide relief
.” This is not true at all. The truth is: Tang Enbo, Jiang Dingwen, Li Jiajue and other senior military officials in Henan have reported
disasters to Chongqing, but the Henan provincial government has been concealing the situation. This kind of difference between the two political parties, there was a head-on conflict at the Xi'an Wangqu Military Conference in September 1942.
The result of the conflict was that Chiang Kai-shek "decided that the 1942 Henan military grain quota (from
4.2 million shi) was reduced to 2.5 million shi" .Details can be found in the previous issue.[Detailed] If you don't believe that there is a disaster in Henan and are unwilling to provide disaster relief,
what is the purpose of reducing the military ration quota in Henan so much?
report about. Guo's so-called "running and calling for political suffragettes and sparing no effort" was on October 30, 1942. At this time,
Yang Yifeng, Liu Zhuangfu and Ren Zhaolu, the three representatives sent by all walks of life in Henan to report the disaster in Chongqing, had successfully conveyed the facts of the disaster in Henan to
Chiang Kai-shek. Yang Yifeng later recalled: "My brother was pushed by all walks of life in Henan as one of the three representatives to appeal to Chongqing. As far as we know, the central government's
understanding of the disaster in Henan was not due to the appeal of Mr. Guo Zhongwei, a political senator from Henan. … The appeal may be something in the
future , and it has nothing to do with the central government's decision to send officials to Henan to investigate the disaster."
Wang Yunsheng said that Chen Brai told him that "the chairman did not believe that there was a disaster in Henan at all", but it was only the
third historical material fabricated by Wang Yunsheng. It was the "Old Ta Kung Pao from 1926 to 1949" written by Wang Yunsheng and Cao Gubing in the 1960s. The article claimed
: "(After Ta Kung Pao was suspended) Wang Yunsheng once asked Chen Brai about this, and Chen Brai said: 'The Chairman is fundamentally
He did not believe that there was a disaster in Henan, and said that the provincial government made a false report on the disaster. Chairman Li (Pei Kee)'s disaster report, saying "a thousand miles of red land", " sorrow is everywhere", "waiting to be fed"
, etc., the chairman of the committee called it a lie and cliché. Strictly ordering Henan's expropriation shall not be
exempted.' This shows Chiang Kai-shek's stubbornness and ignorance of the people's life." On the point that Li Peiji did not report the disaster, Wang Yunsheng
, like Feng Yuxiang, lied blatantly. Chen Brei was the director of the Second Division of Chiang Kai-shek's Attendant Office at the time, and Li Peiji did not report the disaster
. How could Chen tell Wang Yunsheng such a large episode of Li Peiji being scolded for reporting the disaster? This episode was apparently
fabricated by Wang Yunsheng in the 1960s. Furthermore, it was February 1943. Zhang Ji, Zhang Lisheng and others who were sent by Chongqing to Henan to investigate the disaster
had already arrived in Henan in October 1942. The actual situation of the famine had already been transmitted back to Chongqing through them. The work
has been fully rolled out, how could Chen Brei ignore the facts and say to Wang Yunsheng, "The chairman does not believe in Henan at all.
If there is a disaster, what about saying that the provincial government falsely reported the disaster? The only explanation is that Wang Yunsheng fabricated this history in the 1960s. Was the
government forced to start disaster relief after reporter Bai Xiude reported the disaster?
American reporter Bai Xiude On March 22, 1943, he reported on the Henan famine in the American "Time" magazine. In his
memoirs quoted a letter from a "Father Megan", arguing that it was his report that forced the unintentional disaster relief. The Kuomintang
government took action: "Since you left and sent a telegram, grain has been urgently dispatched from Shaanxi along the railway line,
... the provincial government has also been busy and has opened temporary housing units everywhere. ... The army also took out a portion of their food and
played a big role. "Movies and even most domestic media have copied this statement of Bai's later years [detailed]. But this
is not the case.
When Bai Xiude reported the famine in "Time" Weekly, the disaster relief work in the central government and Henan had already been in full swing
since September 1942. At the Wangqu Military Conference in Xi'an on the 9th, after the Henan Army headed by Jiang Dingwen reported the actual situation of the disaster to Chiang Kai-shek
, although the Henan provincial government headed by Li Peiji still maintained a conservative attitude towards the severity of the famine,
the disaster relief work of the Henan provincial government has It had to be started immediately. On September 16, under pressure from the central government, Li Peiji formally established the Henan Provincial Disaster Relief
Committee ; on September 28, Li Peiji officially delivered a speech, proposing that "in the future, this government has decided to make disaster relief a central task. .
Since then, the operation of the entire Henan provincial government has completely shifted to disaster relief mode. At the Wangqu Military Conference, the central government directly reduced
the military grain quota in Henan, and immediately began to transport grain from Shaanxi to Henan.
Generally speaking, from September to 1942 In October, it can be regarded as the first stage of the disaster relief work of the central and Henan localities. Its content mainly
focuses on the investigation of the disaster situation and the formulation of disaster relief plans and methods. The main work of the investigation is to investigate the actual disaster situation in each county,
Record in detail the four types of household registrations as “sufficient, self-sufficient, insufficient, and awaiting rescue”; specific disaster relief plans and methods are
formulated based on the above-mentioned investigations. From October 1942 to January 1943, it can be regarded as the second stage of disaster relief. During this period, various disaster relief work has been carried out
separately . The central government issued three emergency relief funds; the Henan provincial government raised 5 million yuan for the relief, and purchased more than 3
million catties shipped it back for distribution. The local government also raised 10 million yuan. Various relief-for-work programs for displaced people (mainly the establishment of farmland water conservancy, such as
dredging rivers, digging canals, etc.) have also been carried out. The most critical food issue was borrowing 35,000 bales of grain from the rear of the First Theater Command
, then 1.6 million jins of grain from Tang Enbo's department, 3 million jins of grain for the army's diet, and
20,000 bales of stored wheat from Shaanxi Province. , were distributed separately; the warehouses stored in the counties were also ordered to be distributed to the
disaster victims ; other work such as sealing up large households to store grain, setting up porridge factories, and organizing fundraising, etc., were all large during this period. expanded in scale.
For the victims fleeing the famine, relief stations are set up along the main route of their escape to provide food and shelter for the victims.
That is to say, when Bai Xiude published an article in "Time" magazine on March 22, the above-mentioned disaster relief work had been in full swing. "The
grain was urgently dispatched from Shaanxi along the railway line" is not the result of Bai Xiude's report; "The provincial government is also busy"
is not because of Bai Xiude's report; "The army also took out part of their grain" The time was much earlier than Bai Xiude
's report. The Bai family has been in the disaster area for less than 20 days, and the reports of the spectators are not credible. Of course, the four months before the wheat harvest (June) in 1943 was
the most difficult period for the disaster victims. The old grains were exhausted and the new grains were not harvested. At the same time, March was also the most
difficult . The local grains had been distributed. It is very difficult to bring in grain from outside. As the pro-Yan'an American diplomat
Xie Weiss said: "In normal times, grain can be transported into Henan from four directions. Now there are three of these transportation lines.
All aspects were controlled by the Japanese army. Fourth, the transportation capacity from Shaanxi is severely limited, because the
80-kilometer section of the railway between Tongguan and Lingbao is within the
firing The tragic situation is indeed a fact; however, Bai thinks that the authorities did not provide disaster relief before, and only started
disaster relief , which is only a personal assumption.
American diplomat Xie Weiss observed in Henan in November 1942, Much more accurate than Bai Xiude
Xie Weiss was also in Henan in November 1942, and his observations were much more reliable than Bai Xiude. According to Xie's record: "The grain is now also
being shipped to Henan Province, but in small quantities. ... The stationmaster of Tongguan Railway Station said that he did not know the tons of grain shipped, but he told me
that there were usually two trains going east every night, each with an average of 10 wagons and a capacity ranging from 15 to 40 tons. It is conceivable that The average load is 25
tons. As far as I can see, the goods on the eastbound train are all grain. Therefore, I estimate that at least 15,000
tons . The train was extremely difficult and dangerous to drive, traveling at night under the crossfire of Japanese artillery fire. Almost all
bridges were destroyed. Temporary bends are required. In order to keep the railway smooth, railway workers showed great
heroism and wisdom. "If the data surveyed by Xie's is accurate, then this means that the only
railway from Shaanxi to Henan, even if "the goods on the eastbound train are all grain", can only transport 30 million to Henan a month.
According to a survey by the American Relief Commission, there are more than 10,000 people in the disaster-hit areas in Henan, which means that each person can only get three catties of grain each month
from the only railway. This is probably 1942. - The main reason for the
large number If you broaden your horizons a bit, it is not difficult to find that the Henan famine in 1942-1943 was actually only 1
As part of the "Great Famine in the Central Plains" from 942 to 1943, Hebei and Shanxi were also the hardest-hit areas - according to
a document issued by the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Border Region Government "Complete the Grain Absorption and Adjustment Work within a Time Limit, Relief the Disaster Areas, and Ensure Spring Ploughing": " At present, the disaster situation in the fifth and
sixth districts is very serious, nearly half of the people have no food to eat, there are daily reports of people dying of starvation, and spring ploughing has come to a standstill
. The date of issue of the document is March 25, 1943, which is exactly when Bai's
article was published in Time. The CCP’s anti-Japanese basis in the border area of Hebei and Henan is still “nearly half of the people have no food
to eat, and people are dying of starvation every day
. ”
Chiang Kai-shek let the front-line troops retreat, and wanted to leave the victims as a burden to the Japanese?
In the movie, Chiang Kai-shek plans to abandon Henan, let the front-line troops retreat, and throw the victims as a burden to the Japanese army. Some scholars
also wrote an article: "In order to drag down the enemy, the people have become hostages of both the enemy and us. . . . The Japanese-occupied areas not only strictly prohibited the
victims from exile to the rear of the Japanese army, but also deliberately drove the victims to the Kuomintang-controlled areas and the Communist-controlled areas to make them As for the Chinese
side, at this time, firstly, there is no active assistance; secondly, it is actually expected that these victims will be
exiled to the areas occupied by Japan and other parties.” [Detailed] These statements are far from historical facts. It can be described as one hundred and eight thousand miles.
The Henan provincial government has clearly issued an order requiring the counties to cooperate with the national army to "stop the good people from fleeing to enemy areas"
, saying that the government "doesn't actively provide assistance". What does it mean to be "active"? If "active" is defined by "significant effect", then the government
has obviously failed to do so; if "active" is defined as "best effort", the government has not much to blame. As for the hollowing out and corruption of the grass-roots
regime , and the inability to implement disaster relief measures, it is really the stubbornness of the Nationalist government throughout the entire mainland period.
disease. However, to say that the government "also expects these victims to go into exile in the areas occupied by Japan and the other side" is pure slander.
If the government had What's more, the Henan provincial
government issued a special regulation that year, ordering the counties to strictly prevent the victims from fleeing to the enemy areas
. The central government should be inspired by virtue and Italy. (2) Counties should lead the
local community to expand disaster relief campaigns, and try to raise funds and food to be distributed at any time. (3) Counties should effectively supervise their teams to cooperate
with the national army, in the Set up checkpoints at the places leading to the area to prevent the good people from fleeing to the enemy area. (4) If the enemy army collects our strong refugees, they should
be expelled by force at any time and place to smash the conspiracy of the enemy bandits.” (General Report on Disaster Relief Work of Henan Provincial Government ”) The government
not only never “expects these victims to be exiled to the Japanese-occupied areas”, nor has it ever thought of throwing the victims as a burden to the Japanese army.
In 1943, Chiang Kai-shek did withdraw a troop from the front line, but the purpose was to prevent the troop uprising and fall to the CCP
. But what is interesting is that in 1943, Chiang Kai-shek did indeed withdraw a troop from the front line in Henan, namely Zhao Shoushan's
38th . military. But this does not mean that Chiang Kai-shek wants to give up Henan. Until the Japanese army launched the Battle of Henan, Hunan and Guangxi in 1944,
the defense line of the national army in Henan did not move back significantly. Zhao Shoushan's 38th Army was stationed in Zhengzhou and Guangwu in northern Henan at that time. The
reason why was withdrawn from the front line was not because of the famine, but because both Chiang Kai-shek and Tang Enbo believed that this army had been assimilated
and controlled by the Communist Party, and it was possible to raise the flag at any time when it was placed on the front line. Changed flags, so he was first transferred from the front line to Gongxian for "training", essentially placing him
under the control of the national army, and later the pro-CCP army commander Zhao Shoushan was transferred to the general officer class of the Chongqing Central Training Corps. "trained".
For this history, the Zhengzhou Party History of the Communist Party of China compiled by the Party History Working Committee of the Zhengzhou Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China has a detailed record. according to
According to the book, the unit had a Communist Party organization as early as 1927, and was hailed by Mao Zedong as a model of united front work;
when stationed in Gongxian County in 1940, "the unit was underground, and in accordance with the spirit of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, ... In the autumn of 1941, Tang Enbo lost confidence in the
army , believing that it might switch to the Communist Party at any time, so the Central Army "
formed an encirclement of the 38th Army", and the "Working Committee of the 38th Army of the Communist Party of China" therefore "had the same After many studies, Commander Zhao Shoushan prepared
contingency measures and an uprising plan"; "In the spring of 1942, the 38th Military Work Committee took advantage of the opportunity of troop reorganization and personnel changes to transfer underground
party members to key positions. 120 Party members among the graduates of the training class were assigned to serve in the whole army, ready to
deal with sudden incidents." In the autumn of 1942, Zhao Shoushan sent a representative to Yan'an to report the situation and demanded
the , don't openly fight the red flag, but fight the flag of the anti-Japanese allied army of the local troops .... The
timing of the uprising is when Chiang Kai-shek wants to be annexed by armed forces and cannot continue to survive;
"Chongqing has long been aware of these changes within the 38th Army, which is why
the troops were withdrawn from the front line in October 1943, which has nothing to do with the famine.
Did the Japanese military use rations to help the Chinese victims?
There is a scene in the movie: Neji Okamura, commander of the Japanese Army's North China Front, inspected the disaster situation in Henan on a plane, and asked the Japanese army to provide relief to the Chinese victims with
rations . The officers were puzzled: "...But they are Chinese!" Okamura said, "Don't forget,
they are first of all people!" How was the relief of the Japanese army to the victims?
Liu Zhenyun: "In 1943, the Japanese entered the disaster area in Henan, which saved the lives of my villagers."
Regarding the relief of the Japanese army to the disaster victims, Liu Zhenyun's documentary work "Revising the Past 1942" expresses even more extreme:"……
Not all people in Henan died of starvation, and many people still survived and thrived. Fifty years later, it seems to be the
second largest province in China in terms of population. Why didn't he die then? What measures has the government taken? no. Did the
locusts fly away by themselves? no. What is that? The Japanese are here. In 1943, the Japanese entered the disaster area in Henan, which saved
the lives of my fellow villagers. The Japanese committed heinous crimes in China. They
murdered . , saved the lives of
many of my fellow villagers. They distributed us a lot of rations. We ate the rations of the imperial army, and our lives were maintained and
strengthened. Of course, Japan's motives for sending military rations are definitely bad, not good intentions, strategic intentions, political conspiracy,
in order to buy people's hearts, in order to occupy our land, fall into our rivers and mountains, rape our wives and daughters, but they saved us life
. "
But the fact is that Liu's hometown of Yanjin fell as early as 1938, and his "folks" starved to death under the rule of the Japanese army
. The main focus is on the investigation of people
starved , supplemented by various historical archives and documents. Liu cited
the memory of a "county secretary before 1949", saying that "There must be tens of thousands of people starving to death in his hometown Yanjin County." But Liu never told his
readers that his hometown Yanjin County fell as early as 1938. "The villagers" were starved to death and had nothing to do with the Nationalist
government . The so-called "In 1943, the Japanese entered the disaster area in Henan, which saved the lives of my villagers" is
pure nonsense. 1943 , the Japanese did not "drive into the disaster area in Henan". During this period, the defense line of the national army did not
move back significantly. Not only did the Japanese fail to "drive in" to save the lives of the victims in the occupied areas, but also the victims in the occupied areas. life, also
No help.
The disaster in the occupied area was equally serious. The Japanese army had no record of taking the initiative to release food, and the puppet provincial government was unable
to return to Okamura Ningji for disaster relief. In the "Memoirs of Neji Okamura", the author did not find any record of Okamura's visit to Henan to inspect the disaster
. This passage in the movie is definitely made up. However, during the great famine in the Central Plains of 1942-1943, Okamura did have personal
donations . The author saw two kinds of donations, one said it was 80,000 yuan, and the other said it was 25,000 yuan. As for the Japanese army's
"relief of Chinese victims with military grain" in Henan, the author has not consulted any historical materials. However, in the occupied area of Shanxi, which is also under the jurisdiction of Okamura Ningji , the
disaster was also serious in 1943. The Japanese army did not take the initiative to release food. There are occasional records of releasing food. It was also
an emergency measure after being attacked by the victims - such as "Zhengtai Road Yangquan" The station was the food center for the Japanese army. In March 1943,
tens of thousands of victims from all over the country gathered at Yangquan Station. Under the organization of the (CCP) urban workers, they fought for food from the Japanese army and
destroyed many Japanese army grain depots. More than 300 victims in Yangquan surrounded the Japanese army headquarters for three days from March 20, forcing the Japanese army to
take part of the looted food and distribute it to the victims." ("Shanxi Chronicle") The
Japanese army did not release the grain, and at that time presided over the fall of Henan. The puppet Henan provincial government, which is in the area of government affairs, is also lacking in disaster relief work.
Tian Wenbing, the puppet governor of Henan Province who took office in March 1943, has a reputation of being honest and capable, and has long maintained secret contacts with the CCP. According
to Tian's daughter Tian Shuping, "In 1943, there was a locust plague in Henan Province, and people fled to Hubei, Anhui and other provinces.
These neighboring provinces were reluctant to accept the victims. Tian then negotiated with the two provinces as the governor. After several setbacks, he was able to allow the victims to enter. Although this could
not eradicate the suffering of the victims, it relatively reduced the suffering of some victims. In the autumn of the same year, Tian also raised food to help the
victims.” Tian is most famous for disaster relief in the occupied areas.
A train is specially designed for victims to bring their old clothes to the area of Xuzhou to exchange for corn and other items, so as to relieve the food shortage and prevent starvation to death. "Tian
's disaster relief measures are limited to this, because all the food is in the hands of the Japanese army. Before the autumn harvest
, Tian has no other way than to transport the victims out. Before Tian took office, according to Xie Weiss in November 1942
Xie's observation should be accurate. Before Tian Wenbing, the puppet governor of Henan Province was Chen Jingzhai
, who had been entrenched in Henan for four years and his notoriety had spread far and wide. Xing Hansan, who served as the head of the propaganda department of Henan Province, recalled that this person "has been on the job about five times more than Tian, but he may not have spent
as much time sitting in the office as Tian."
During the period when Chen Jingzhai was in power, it is natural to imagine how the relief work was carried out
. There is no data on how many people starved to death in the occupied areas during this period because they were under the control of the Japanese army, but you can refer to Ding Ling's 1944
"129" Teachers and the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Border Region", which quoted statistics from the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Border Region, stating that "Taiyue District
has no less than 200,000 refugees from all over northern Henan, and Taihang District has also absorbed 40,000 or 50,000 foreign disaster victims. ", all of northern Henan belonged to the
occupied areas. Under the premise that the Japanese army strictly prevented the refugees from the occupied areas from fleeing the nationally-controlled areas and the jointly-occupied areas (the Japanese army was in short supply at this time)
, 200,000 victims crossed the blockade and fled to the CCP base area. Quite a large number. The other victims who fled to the wider
occupied eastern areas and the Kuomintang-ruled areas, I don't know how many. The Chongqing "Xinhua Daily" on February 16, 1943 had the
title "People in the enemy-occupied areas in northern Henan are in dire straits. The disaster was severe, and many people changed their children to eat, and the enemy squeezed the grain and went away".
Conclusion
Regarding the 1942-1943 famine in Henan, there are too many pseudo-history in the reports on the market. For example, Tang En
Bo did not provide disaster relief, and when the army was defeated, there were still 1 million bags of flour in stock. Thinking about it with a little brain, I also know that this kind of evidence is untenable- Tang's defeat was in April
1944, and the famine came to an end in the autumn of 1943;
What is the relationship between half a cent of military supplies in stock for half a year and disaster relief? Another example is a common detail in media reports, saying
that the telegraph operator who sent Bai Xiude to New York was killed by Chiang Kai-shek, but as long as you carefully read the original text of Bai Xiude's
memoirs , you can see that there is clearly written "I guess..." In fact, even Bai Xiude himself was not sure whether there was
such an upright telegraph operator.
The slogan is really good, "a forgotten history, a truth that must be faced"; it's just that in the pseudo-history "
reviewing " and finally "knowing", what will be "new"?
View more about Back to 1942 reviews
